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Introduction
Respondents filed this cross appeal to bring the Court's attention to the lack of evidence of
Brady Barkdull, Hugh Barkdull, Mike Cook and P&S regarding their alleged liability to Wesco.
Additionally, there is a lack of evidence to support a claim for damages. The cross-appeal asks this
Court to grant a full summary judgment to all defendants on all counts, or alternatively, to expand
the trial court's partial summary judgment to include other defendants and other counts as the Court
sees fit.
Summary of Facts on Cross Appeal
This case arose out of competition within the Eastern Idaho automobile paint and equipment
supply industry. Wesco bought three stores in the region and began supplying the stores from its
own sources, cutting off Ernest and Davis' company, APW, which had been the supplier for those
stores for many years. Ernest and Davis responded to Wesco's move into the area by using their
existing company, P&S, to open three new stores in the same area. Ernest and Davis attempted to
recruit Wesco's new employees, who had been working at the stores Wesco had purchased. Ernest
and Davis were more successful than they ever hoped and almost all of the employees decided to
switch to the new P&S stores. Wesco responded by suing Ernest and Davis, APW, P&S, and all of
the employees. The trial court dismissed the case against Ernest, Davis and APW, acknowledging
that they had engaged in perfectly lawfnl competition. The trial court also dismissed many of the
counts against P&S and the other employees, as detailed in the trial court's decision and as
summarized by both parties in prior briefs. Later, Wesco decided to dismiss all of the other
RespondenhlCross Appellant Reply Brief
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employees, except the Barkdulls and Cook. The remaining defendants filed a renewed motion for
full summary judgment to have the entire case dismissed, but the trial judge denied that motion,
letting the previous partial s m w judgment stand
The issues before the Court is whether the remaining-defendantswere engaged in some type
ofwrongful conspiracy which caused harm to Wesco (or whether the employees were simply making
career decisions, as they had the right to do as at will employees) and whether any of the remaining
defendants violated any duty or law during the transition.

I.

The Barkdulls and Cook did not illegally recruit other employees, and nothing in their'
conduct caused any damages to Wesco.
Wesco is unable to point to any evidence that Brady Barkdull engaged in wrongful conduct

during the time he was making his decision to switch employers. Instead, Wesco asks that the
allegations proceed to trial on Wesco's suspicion that there may have been a "nudge" or a "wink."
Note, though, that even the existence of the "nudge" or "wink" relies on speculation; Wesco has no
evidence of such behavior. To rely on speculation that there was a conspiracy to "steal" employees
through illegal recruiting requires this Court to ignore the deposition testimony of every defendant
and to replace the evidence with Wesco suspicion and speculation. The law does not permit a
motion for summary judgment to be defeated with mere suspicion or speculation; there must be at
least a scintilla of evidence. Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 6 15,620,84 P.3d 55 1,556 (2004). Basing

a case on suspicion and speculati011is not how the law works, for good reason, and the Court should
rule that there is no evidence of wrongful conduct by any of the remaining defendants against Wesco.
RespondentsICross Appellant Reply Brief
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Wesco's suspicions are focused on Brady Barkdull. Without being able to show any
evidence that Barkdull was involved in illegally recruiting his fellow employees, Wesco asserts
instead the legal position that Barkdull had a legal duty to tattle-tale to Wesco about Ernest and
Davis giving him an offer of employment, or to inform Wesco that he believed Ernest and Davis
would be making similar offers to other employees. Perhaps, after receiving an employment offer
from a competitor, some employees would have run back to Wesco to warn them, and to receive
brownie points; however, there is no law that imposes a legal duty on an at-will employee to tell his
employer that he is considering quitting, or that he knows other employees are being recruited.
Because there is no law to support Wesco's position, Wesco relies on general principles of fiduciary
duty, and seeks to have this Court impose a higher duty on at-will employees than is appropriate.
This Court should not expand an at-will employee's duties by imposing a "tattle-tale" duty on
Barkdull or the others. Such aruling would fly in the face of the clear statements of the law that an
employee has the right to make plans to start anewjob or to open a competing business, as discussed
by the trial judge in his decision and in the prior Brief. The simple logic used by the trial judge in
ruling on this issue applies: if an employee has no duty to inform his employer that he is seeking
new employment, or of the employee's plan to start a competing business, he also has no duty to tell
his employer of the fact that a competitor has made him an offer or is planning to start acompeting
business. The same applies to any evidence that Barkdull may have assisted Ernest in finding a new
store location; if the law allows Barkdull to look for a store for his own competing business, how
can he be found liable if he assisted a competitor in the same limited fashion?
RespondeotslCross Appellant Reply Brief
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Respondents disagree most strongly with Wesco's assertion that Barkdull breached a duty
by telling Ernest and Davis that he would only consider working for them if other employees also
made the switch. There is no question that Ernest and Davis, as competitors, had the right to open
new stores in the area and to compete for Wesco's employees. With no evidence that Barkdull
participated in this recruitment, the Court should rule as a matter of law that waiting to make his
decision until the others had made their decisions is simply not a breach of the duty owed by an
employee to his employer. The ruling requested by Wesco is a dangerous precedent that would
severely restrict an employee's ability ( and right) to seek better employment.
The law already has in place a system that employers can use to protect themselves from
competition from their own employees: non-compete agreements. Wesco chose not to use this
protection, apparently because it was not willing to give up its own right to fire any or all of its
employees at any time, with or without notice or cause. Given that Wesco, only a few weeks earlier,
had made efforts to make sure each employee knew of his or her at will status, it seems strange to
hear Wesco now claim these same employees had a high "fiduciary duty" that would prohibit them
from quitting if it created a hardship for Wesco.
The deposition testimony of all the employees, as cited in the previous Brief, makes it clear
that by Friday, August 22, the employees had made their decisions to quit. They were mindful that
their jobs were to begin at the P&S stores immediately, and were also mindful that when P&E had
been purchased they had been notified of the sale by fax, and then required to sign agreements
acknowledging their at will status. It seemed fair to them that their resignation notice could be sent
RespondentslCross Appellant Reply Brief
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in the same manner that they had been notified which was by fax and without advanced warning.
As at will employees, they had the right to quit in the manner they saw fit, just as Wesco had the
right to fire all of them at any time without notice or reason. The fact that they admit consulting with
one another, and using the same form resignation letter, is not evidence of an illegal conspiracy.

An at-will employee's decision to quit on short notice is simply not actionable. This Court
should not impose a duty on at-will employees to give notice simply because more than one
employee is quitting. Nor should the court create a rule that, if the employees' resignation would
be a hardship for the employer, they cannot quit their jobs. Note that such a law would be a clear
double standard favoring Wesco: Wesco reserves the right to fire any or all employees without
notice or cause; but claims the employees owe a high fiduciary duty to not do the same thing. It is
not the law that an at-will employer is prohibited from laying off more than one person per day, nor
is an employer prohibited from laying off an at will employee if it would work a hardship on the
employee, the employee's family, or on the community when a large group of people are laid off at
the same time. Wesco is asking this Court to go far astray from the at-will employment law and
impose special work place protections for Wesco's benefit that simply do not exist in the law.
At one point in its reply brief Wesco discusses anti-trust law, admitting that it is only by
analogy. The analogy, according to Wesco, is that if an anti-trust case can be brought without proof
of an express agreement (to fix prices) and as long as certain "plus-factors" exist, then employers
should be allowed to sue their at will employeesfor quitting, if several of them quit at the same time.
Wesco asks essentially that this court establish a legal presumption that if several employees quit at
RespondentsICross Appellant Reply Brief

Page 5

the same time, they should be liable to the employer and it should be assumed that they engaged in
a wrongful conspiracy. The analogy does not work and this court shouldnot expand employment law
to include anti-trust principles. The fact is, Wesco lacks the evidence it needs to proceed against the
remaining defendants and, without such evidence, all remaining defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Counts I and 11.

I1

Wesco cannot tie any damages to the allegations of wrongful conduct which survived
the trial court's summary judgment ruling.
The bottom line in this matter, which is ihe very reason Wesco wanted to proceed to the

appeal rather than try the case, is that Wesco cannot connect its inability to make a profit to any
alleged wrongful conduct of any defendant that survived the trial court's partial summary judgment
ruling. The law may not require Wesco to precisely prove the amount of damages caused by each
alleged misconduct, but Wesco must prove that the alleged misconduct was a substantial factor in
causing damages. If it cannot prove this, the case must be dismissed, as in Dmn', T r i l o d , Magic
Valley Trucp, Trugreen4 and Saks.' These cases serve as examples that it is not enough to merely

prove a violation of a duty, but that damages must also be proven with enough specificity to take the

' ~ u n v.n Ward, 105 Idaho 354, *357,670 P.2d 59, **62 (1983)
2

Trilogy Networks Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 1119 (Idaho 2007).

3Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. vs. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110, 982 P.2d 945 (1999).
4~rugveenCompanies, LLC vs. Scotts Lawn Service, 508 F.Supp.2d 937 (2007); see also
Trugreen Companies, L.L.C. v. Mower Brothers, Inc., 2007 W L 1696860 (D. Utah).
5

Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc. v. James, LTD., 630 S.E.2d 304 (Va. 2006).

RespondentslCross Appellant Reply Brief
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damages out of the realm of speculation. In each of these cases plaintiff proved a clear breach, but
zero damages were awarded.
Likewise, where the trial court felt there may have been at the time of the first summary
judgment ruling, some issues of fact on minor disputes regarding possible liability, Wesco's utter
failure to point to any damages flowing from the alleged breaches of duty requires this court to grant
full summary judgment on all counts and for all defendants.

EL. David Smiths affidavit and opinions do not create an issue of fact as to the causation
of damages.
Wesco puts forward the supplemental report of its expert witness, David Smith, as evidence
that the alleged misconduct of the defendants caused its failure to make a profit during the years
since the new P&S stores started competing with Wesco. Wesco does not mention that the trial
judge struck David Smith's first report. R. Vof. VII, p. 1214. The basis for the court's prohibiting
David Smith from testifying are contained in the opposing report of the defendants' economist, Tyler
Bowles. R. Vol. V, p. 927. Essentially the court agreed that it was improper to allow David Smith
to testify to a $4.5 million loss without specifying who and how the loss was caused. Wesco
submitted a second report from David Smith, but this report failed to remedy the underlying problem
of failing to link an alleged wrong with any damages. Instead the report takes each remaining
allegation and makes a general conclusion, repeated over and over, that such allegations are a
substantial factor inthe $4.5 million loss claimed by Wesco. The defendants quickly filed a motion
to strike the second report on the same basis, hut the court decided not to rule on or even consider
the motion to strike Davis Smith's supplemental report. R. Vol. VII. P. 1218.
RespondentsICrossAppellant Reply Brief
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Despite the trial judge's decision not to consider whether the Supplemental Report was
admissible, this court has Smith's Supplemental report and can see it suffers from severe short
comings. It relies on generalities and accusations, many of which have been dismissed on summary
judgment, and all of which are unsubstantiated by the record, and then fails to make a causal link
between any alleged wrongful conduct by a defendant and any claimed damages. Such a report is
not evidence and should not be considered. Expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or
unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict and,
therefore, is inadmissible as evidence." Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834,
837, 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007); Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46,

995 P.2d 816, (2000); Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561,565,97 P.3d 428,432 (Idaho,2004). Such
a report likewise does not create an issue of fact and should not be used to deny a motion for
summary judgment based on failure to have supporting evidence for a damage claim.
In addition to the Idaho cases, there are excellent cases from other jurisdictions which are
very close factually and legally to Wesco's case. These cases include Trugreen6 and S a h 7 , both
discussed in the prior brief, which illustrate how Rule 702 operates to bar the type of irrelevant and
speculative testimony being offered by Smith. The analysis in Trugreen, in particular, is very
applicable to the Smith opinion, even in light of Smith's supplemental report. The few areas where

6

Tri~greenCompanies, LLC vs. Scotts Lawn Service, 508 F.Supp.2d 937 (2007); see also
Trugreen Companies, L.L.C. v. Mower Brothers, Inc., 2007 W L 1696860 (D. Utah).
7

Saks F$h Avenue, Inc. v. James, LTD., 630 S.E.2d 304 (Va. 2006).
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Wesco's case differs from Trugreen actually favor the defendants, making it more obvious that
David Smith's opinion should be disallowed. For instance, in Trugreen there actually was a
noncompetition agreement. This made it tempting to believe there had to be some damages; whereas
in Wesco's case there is neither a noncompete agreement or any other type of agreement, making
it less likely there are any damages at alt. Rather, Wesco has multiple theories, making it even more
imperative that an expert be willing and able to sort out the multiple claims and the multiple
defendants and establish that specific allegations are a substantial factor in the plaintifl's claim for
damages. Smith fails to do that.
In Trugreen the expert had at least attempted to estimate the percent of lost revenue that
resulted fromthe loss ofthe employees who violated the noncompete agreement, as opposed to other
causes of losses. He "guesstimated" the amount at 30%. The Trugreen court ruled there was no
support for the "guesstimate" and excluded the testimony. Smith, in his supplemental report still
fails to even make a "guesstimate" as to what portion of the $4.5 million was caused by any alleged
wrongful conduct by each defendant, opting instead to lump each employee into the vast bulk of the
losses which were obviously caused by other factors. This is exactly what the Trugreen court was
criticizing when it pointed out the rule that a "court may exclude evidence where it finds an
impermissible analytical gap exists between the premises and the conclusion." Trugreen,at 958.
The David Smith supplemental report does not create an issue of fact on how any remaining alleged
misconduct was a substantial factor in Wesco's claimed losses.

RespondentslCross Appellant Reply Brief
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Another flaw in Smith's $4.5 million opinion is his failure to deal with the complexities of
the facts, particularly the many undisputed reasons why Wesco's losses were actually caused by
lawful competition. Wesco makes light of these factors, claiming they are akin to speculating that
there might be a meteor strike. However, the multiple other reasons why Wesco lost money, which
are listed at page 39 of the Respondents' Brief, are supported by the record and are undisputed.
Those factors are undisputed facts. Three P&S stores were opened. Ernest and Davis lawfully
recruited employees to staff their new stores. The employees had the right to work for the new stores
and to use their knowledge and skills at the new P&S stores. Other factors also included the absence
of non-compete agreements that would have helped protect Wesco, the at-will status of the defendant
employees, the pre-existing good will of Ernest and Davis, the dismissal of most of the defendants
with prejudice by W e ~ c oand
, ~ so forth. The point is that these events are undisputed, unlike the

'Smith's failure to address the significance of multiple defendants having been either
dismissed from the case on summary judgment or being voluntarily dismissed with prejudice is
one of the factors that make this case and Trugreen amazingly similar. This was a specific
additional and independent reason to disregard the expert testimony in Trugreen:
In addition, a change in the circumstances of this case renders the report speculative.
TruGreen has recently stipulated to the dismissal of nine employees. While these
were more lower-level employees, surely, if Mr. Elggren's theory is true, they had at
least some role in the increased profits. His report indicates that it is based on the
damage caused by all eighteen employees originally sued in this case. Therefore, the
court lacks admissible evidence of what damage is attributable to the nine employees
remaining in this case.

Trugreen, at 961. Thus, if for no other reason, Smiths failure to acknowledge and address that all
of the harm alleged against the dismissed defendants should be deducted from the $4.5 million
warrants disallowing his testimony because it is speculative, not to mention misleading and
inaccurate.
RespondentslCross Appellant Reply Brief
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meteor strike. When combined together these factors explain all of Wesco's losses, none.of which
were proximately caused by any alleged wrongful conduct of the remaining defendants. Just as with
the expert's failures in Trugreen, Smith's supplementalreport fails to address any of these concerns,
or to even acknowledge the existence of the confounding variables that must be dealt with in this
case. This failure renders his opinionunreliable and flat out misleading, and it should not be relied
on to defeat this motion for full summaryjudgment.
Lest one think Trugreen is an odd case, a review of the primary case relied on by the court
in Trugreen shows a similar result where expert testimony was disallowed because it failed to deal
with the true complexities (and realities) ofthe facts of the case. Instorage Technology Corporation
v. Cisco Systems Inc., 2003 WL 2223 1544, afirmed 395F.3d 921 (8" Cir., Minn. 2005), the court
explained its reasoning for striking generalizedtestimony of lump sum damages. It quoted aFederal
Seventh Circuit case as follows:
For years we have been saying, without much visible effect, that people who want
damages have to prove them, using methodologies that need not be intellectually
sophisticated but must not insult the intelligence. Post hoc ergopropter hoc will not
do; nor the enduing of simplistic extrapolation and childish arithmetic with the
appearance of authority by hiring a professor to mouth damages theories that make
ajoke of expert knowledge. The expert should have tried to separate the damages that
resulted from [a competitor's lawful conduct] from the damages that resulted from
particular forms of misconduct allegedly committed by that competitor.... No such
effort was made. Allowance for uncertainty is one thing, and rank speculation
another. (citation omitted).
Both the Storage Technology expert and Wesco's expert refused to sort out and establish the actual
causes of the losses they wish to testify. Both wish to simply state a large number and then expect
RespondentsICross Appellant Reply Brief
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the jury to sort it out, without giving the jury any basis for such a calculation. This is not
permissible.
The inadequacies of Smith's supplemental report are discussed in detail by the defendant's
expert witness, economist Tyler Bowles, in his opinion letter of March 6 , 2008. R. Vol. VIII, p.
1401. Bowles discusses what a valid expert opinion would have to include to be admissible, and

compares it to Smith's report. I-le states that Smith's opinion extremely wanting, pointing out that
the supplemental report suffers the same flaws as Smith's original report: its failure to apply a
rational, coherent economic damage methodology. Essentially, the report fails to explain how any
remaining allegations against any defendant, if proven true could be the proximate cause of the
claimed losses.
Wesco has asserted its belief that it only need show that some alleged misconduct by a
defendant is a "substantial factor" in its losses. While this may be the rule, the fact is, Wesco has
failed to do this. Smith's supplemental report fails to show that the accusations which remain after
the partial summary judgment caused any specific type, or amount, of a loss. More importantly,
Smith fails to show how it could be that the many obvious causes of Wesco's losses, such as lawful
competition, lawful resignation of key employees, customer free choice, the reputation of P&S's
owners, and so forth, were not the entire cause of Wesco's failure to meet its profit expectations.
The numerous cases cited where misconduct in competition was found, but where no
damages were awarded, make it plain to see that there is frequently no proof of damages in business
loss cases. These cases point out the necessity of being able to prove damages. A party hiring an
RespondentsICross Appellant Reply Brief
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expert to give a lump sum number, such as Smith has done, without being able to tie the wrongful
conduct to the damages, does not remedy the plaintiffs problems in such a case. Despite Smith's
supplemental report, Wesco has still failed to demonstrate that any of the remaining allegations
against the remaining defendants were a substantial factor in its claimed losses. Smith's report is
not sufficient to prevent full summary judgment for all defendants.

IV.

Wesco must prove more than a "likeliiood of confusion" to survive a summary
judgment on damages.
Statements made throughout Wesco's brief make it clear that the parties will have to agree

to disagree on some aspects of the law. For instance, on page 19 of its brief, Wesco boldly states that
"defendants are wrong" and that Wesco does not need to show "actual confusion" to prove unfair
competition, hut only a "likelihood of confusion." Wesco cites to American Home Benejt, a 1942
case where the plaintiff was not seeking damages at all, but was seeking only an injunction. The
court granted the injunction because of the "likelihood of confusion." American Home BeneJid had
nothing to do with damages and the "likelihood of confusion" standard is inapplicable to Wesco's
claim for damages. Wesco is seeking monetary damages and must have evidence linking awrongful
act to actual monetary damages. As in other numerous cases, a failure to prove this link is fatal to
Wesco's case for monetary damages.
The defendants stand on their original assertion: Wesco must have some proof that conhsion
as to source was a substantial factor in their losses. Wesco has no proof at all. There is no evidence
that a single customer was confused or Wesco lost a single saIe to a confused customer. Count V
should be dismissed.
RespondentsICross Appellant Reply Brief

Page 13

V.

Wesco does not have evidence that Cook's deletion of files from his local computer
caused Wesco any losses.
While Cook admits deleting his own files from his computer, there is no evidence, and not

even an accusation, that he damaged or took information off of Wesco's servers in Washington. The
record is clear that the computer at issue was his desktop computer, not one of the terminals used
to access the computers containing Wesco's customer information in Washington. This particular
computer was never used in interstate commerce and nothing Cook did on this computer affected
Wesco's out of state servers. This is made clear by a review of their expert's affidavit, Wes
Goodwin. He only examined a single hard drive on a single computer in the Pocatello store.
Goodwin only opines that files appeared to have been deleted from this single computer. R. Vol.
11, P. 307. There is no mention of accessing or damaging Wesco's out of state computers, or of
doing anything at all on the internet. Thus, it is inappropriate for Wesco to rely on 18 U.S.C. 1030
as a cause of action against Cook.
More significantly, there is no proof of any damages caused by Cook regardless of whatever
Wesco is able to prove Cook did with his work computer before leaving the store on his last day.

It is a great exaggeration for Wesco to claim these files caused an interruption in service. Cook's
conduct had no effect whatsoever on Wesco's servers or on the three terminals which were actually
hooked to Wesco's servers. Wesco's servers still contained all of the invoices, customer accounting,
orders and so forth, all of which were unaffected by whatever deletions took place on the C drive of
Cook's computer. In fact, the defendant employees did not have access to this information and could
RespondentslCrossAppellant Reply Brief
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not delete it or copy it from Wesco's servers in Washington. R. Vol. IV, p. 648 (Johnston, 47: 1618).
David Smith's bald assertion without making a causal link that Cook's conduct was a
substantial factor in the $4.5 million loss is not enough to defeat summary judgment. Smith in no
way explains how having files deleted from the C drive on a local computer caused any of Wesco's
losses. Without being able to make that causal connection, summary judgment on Counts VII, VIII
and X is also warranted.

Conclusion
It's clear from the record that each of the remaining defendants, and the counts against them,
should be dismissed because Wesco has failed to raise a genuine issue of fact on liability or damages.
DATED this

day of July, 2009

MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED

Kent L. I-lawkins
Attorneys for Defendants
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